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A Response to Rolston

WE ARE TOO _

Peter S. Wenz
Did you know that philosophers have
also made a contribution to the growth of
the animal liberation movement? Think of Regan, Singer, Clark, Magel,
Rollin and Sapontzis.

Sangamon State University
have always profited from reading the work
of Holmes Rolston III and find his review of
my book both helpful and stimulating. More
than anything else, I see in Rolston's
comments a challenge to clarify the meaning and
implications of my Concentric Circle Theory and to
defend ethical pluralism against the charge that "it
is tacitly a confession of ignorance and failure of
nerve." Since the Concentric Circle Theory is my
form of pluralism, I will attempt to vindicate
pluralism in part by showing that my Concentric
Circle Theory provides solid guidance and
reasonable answers to the specific moral issues that
Rolston raises.
I begin by thanking Rolston for pointing out that
my Concentric Circle Theory is more a theory of
ethics than merely ofjustice. Especially where nonsentient beings (e.g. plants) and holistic entities
(e.g. ecosystems and species) are concerned, the
notion of justice seems strained, or metaphorical,
at best. And, as Rolston notes, "love, not justice,
seems the richer category for the maturing ethic." .
This suggests to me that I could enrich the
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Concentric Circle Theory by explicitly including in
all the concentric circles consideration of ethical
matters outside the domain ofjustice in the narrow
sense.
Rolston worries, however, that the Concentric
Circle Theory will in any case bring confusion to
our moral deliberations. This is due to the egocentric reference that the theory employs. Each
moral agent is the center of her own set of concentric circles. "Could this mean," Rolston asks,
"that at the same event in Earth history ... I
operate pulled by positive rights theory while you
feel no such pull but operate with utilitarian
theory?" I reply in the affirmative, and common
sense concurs. Just as my daughters have legal
rights to support from me but not from most other
people, it is normally assumed that my daughters
have positive rights to help from me (e.g. for cosmetic orthodontia or educational benefits above
the standard minimum) which most others could
justify providing to my daughters only on the basis
of a different principle, such as the utilitarian principle. Because relationships among human beings
often affect not only the strength of obligations but
their underlying rationales, this is the kind of case
that the Concentric Circle Theory handles well,
especially when love is added to the list of available
rationales.
On the Concentric Circle Theory, then, Rolston
asks, "Does one have more obligations to endangered grizzlies in one's home state than to elephants in Kenya?" This is a good question. I answer
that with animals, as with people, obligations follow
from the nature of one's actual and possible relationships. Often the number and complexity of
such relationships vary indirectly with the distance
between the relata. But this is not always the case.
For example, if I were the director of a zoo or an
importer ofjewelry made in Africa, my actions may
have greater bearing on the Kenyan elephants than
on the grizzlies of my home state. In that case (all
other things being equal) I should conduct myself
with greater care concerning the elephants than
concerning the grizzlies. If, on the other hand, I
have no special ties to either animal, my duties
would be greater concerning the grizzlies because I
have more opportunity, due to physical and
political proximity, to have a positive effect on the
grizzlies' welfare.
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Another question about the placement of
animals on concentric circles concerns the
animals' inherent capacities. Rolston reasons,
"Since the capacity for experience (the degree to
which an animal is a subject-of-a-life) varies widely,
one might expect this to affect their locations" on
concentric circles. I believe that this is correct and
now maintain that although all subjects-of-a-life
have negative rights, the strengths of those rights
vary with the animals' capacities. Thus, as Rolston
suggests, fish have less commanding negative rights
than do seals. Rodents are similarly related to
chimpanzees, and chimpanzees to people. This
represents a change in my view and makes it easier
for me to explain why, when push comes to shove,
as in the case oflnuit hunting seals, the human way
of life may justly take precedence over the lives of
the seals.
Rolston is probably correct that I have at certain
points in the book been unduly influenced by legal
thought. This may be a case in point. Rights in the
law are typically (though not always) all or nothing
propositions; e.g. one either has the right to vote
or one does not, the will is valid or it is not, etc. I
now believe that in morality, even where rights are
concerned, matters of degree are almost always
important. (This is recognized, too, in those parts
of the law which are most sensitive to moral considerations. Thus, in the criminal law, for example, we
speak of degrees of culpability and of mitigating
circumstances.) So I now think negative rights
obtain in different degrees of strength, varying
with the inherent capacities of different species.
I also believe that all su bjects-of-a-life with the
same inherent capacities, i.e. of the same species,
have the same negative rights, and negative rights
of the same strength. Negative rights are in this
respect still different, in my view, from positive
rights. The pull on me of someone's positive rights
varies with the nature of our relationship. I illustrated this earlier. My daughter may be able to
claim from me, but certainly not from most other
people, the positive right to the provision of cosmetic orthodontia. But because positive rights
apply only to members of one species, human
beings, they do not vary with the inherent capacities of rights-holders. They vary only with interpersonal relationships. Negative rights do not vary
with interpersonal relationship but do vary with the
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exactly which of the conflicting rules or principles
utilitarians are required to follow.
At least for the time being, then, the use of pluralism is inevitable. Martha Nussbaum argues (convincingly, I think) in The Fragility of Goodness3 that
such pluralism is a permanen t feature of the
human condition. Be that as it may, we are all currently practicing pluralists
pluralists of one sort or another.
There is some gain in recognizing this fact. If
relying upon good judgment, which pluralism
requires, is muddling through, as Rolston suggests,
at least those who realize that they are practicing
pluralists are less muddled than others. Being less
muddled, they can choose carefully the form and
nature of their pluralism, rather than rely upon
unconscious, unexamined, and possibly inconsistent, cultural imperatives.
Allowing that there is some truth in Rolston's
characterization of good judgment as "muddling
through" does not commit me to the view that pluralist theories are worthless. They explain options
to us, thereby mapping the ethical landscape
without telling us where to go. Some maps are
better and (what is not the same thing) more
detailed than others. I believe that the Concentric
Circle Theory presen
presented
ted in Environmental Justice
provides a great deal of helpful guidance, as I hope
its use earlier in this short paper has already shown.
The Theory's full development requires, however,
that I provide much more of what Rolston has so
helpfully elicited, viz. concrete applications of the
theory to situations and conditions that we meet in
life.

capacities inherent in typical members of different
(subjects-of-a-life) species.
Rolston wonders what I would do about feral
goats who were endangering rare plant species on
San Clemente Island. My position, as explained in
my treatment of what I call Biocentric
Individualism, is that individual plants are of only
small worth in their own right. However, species,
both of plan
plants
ts and of animals, are extremely
important. I do not provide separate place for them
on the concentric circle, though, because I share
the view of Alistaire Gunn 1 and Bryan Norton 2 that
the best approach to species preservation is the
preservation of complex ecosystems. Such
ecosystems are essential for natural evolution. They
have what Rolston nicely terms "systemic value." By
thus concen trating on preserving diverse
ecosystems, I believe that my model does adequately address issues of endangered species. So,
for example, I would recommend removing the
feral goats (without killing them, if possible) in
order to preserve the diversity of the ecosystem and
therewith the endangered plant species.
I now turn to Rolston's skepticism concerning
the intellectual legitimacy of any pluralist ethical
theory. He fears that such pluralism "is tacitly a confession of ignorance and failure of nerve." The
individual judgment that all such theories call for
"will often be little more than a euphemism for
'muddling through'."
It seems to me that unless and until we can find a
single master principle from which we can actuaUy
derive the particular moral judgments that we must
make in life, some form of pluralism is inevitable.
No single master principle that meets these specifications is even so much as under discussion by contemporary philosophers. Utilitarians claim to have
a single, worthwhile master principle, but none
among them can seriously claim that they can in
difficult situations actually derive partiCUlar moral
judgments from that principle. R.M. Hare, for
example, admits candidly that superhuman intellectual abilities are needed for the direct application of utilitarianism. Indirect utilitarianism is in
no better shape because equally superhuman abilities are required to derive from the utilitarian principle subsidiary rules, principles and/or
rules-of-thumb of sufficient specificity as to enable
people reliably to know in difficult cases of conflict
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Notes
1 Alistaire S. Gunn, "Preserving Rare Species," in Tom Regan,
ed., Earthbound (New York: Random House, 1984): 289-335.
2 Bryan G. Norton, Why Preserve Natural Variety (Princeton,
NJ. Princeton University Press, 1988).
3 Martha C. Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness (Cambridge
University Press, 1986).
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